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I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans have long been reluctant to develop a system of univer-
sal health care,1 and they remain reluctant about implementing the Af-
fordable Care Act, promulgated in 2010.2 The United States spends more 
on health care per capita than any other nation,3 yet the results of that 
expenditure are wanting.4 Various explanations for the gap between 
spending and results refer to economic factors,5 special interests,6 politi-
cal commitments,7 and dedication to finding private solutions for public 
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 1. Why Not the Best? Results From a National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-
Reports/2006/Sep/Why-Not-the-Best--Results-from-a-National-Scorecard-on-U-S--Health-System-
Performance.aspx. 
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. 
 3. Noam M. Levey, U.S. Health care Spending Far Outpaces Other Countries, L.A. TIMES, 
June 30, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/30/news/la-heb-health-spending-20110630. 
 4. UNITED HEALTH FOUNDATION, AMERICA’S HEALTH RANKINGS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR 
PEOPLE & THEIR COMMUNITIES 9 (2007), available at http://www.borderhealth.org/files/res_1246. 
pdf (noting the low rank of the United States.compared to other nations with regard to life expectan-
cies and infant mortality rates). 
 5. See generally LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH 
CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA (2002) (examining economic and political dimensions of the na-
tion’s refusal to develop a universal health care system). 
 6. Id. at 284. 
 7. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1984) 
(documenting the history of opposition to health care reform in the U.S.). 
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conundrums.8 None of these explanations is wrong. None, however, tells 
the full story. 
This Article offers a different explanation and focuses on the na-
tion’s opaque class system. It suggests that dedication to assumptions 
about class is an essential component of the nation’s longstanding resis-
tance to constructing a more equitable system of health care coverage.9 
This Article describes the nation’s class ideology and how that ideology 
is reflected in national discourse about health care reform. Specifically, it 
illustrates these matters through the lens of American society’s reactions 
to poor women in need of reproductive care. 
The process leading to the Affordable Care Act’s passage, as well 
as state and federal legislative responses in the year following the Act’s 
passage, do not bode well for these women and their essential health 
needs. The political process of health care reform seemed to displace 
concern about the matter actually at issue—health care coverage—with 
concern about abortion and family-planning services for poor women.10 
Cliff-hanging negotiations about abortion coverage shaped the final con-
gressional vote on the Act, and the law’s passage depended on President 
Obama’s executive order, which restricted the use of funds made availa-
ble pursuant to the law for abortion coverage.11 
Ten months later, the 112th Congress initiated its session in the 
House with the introduction of a bill to repeal the health care reform law 
completely,12 and soon after, the House considered another bill aimed at 
cementing the ban on abortion funding through the health care reform 
law.13 At the same time, many states passed or at least considered bills 
that limited funding for abortion and general reproductive care.14 These 
laws disproportionately affect poor women.15 
Thus, passage of a health care reform law reshaped and reinforced a 
narrative about poor women and their reproductive lives—a narrative 
that instantiates the nation’s ideology of class. It is a narrative grounded 
on Americans’ commitment to a highly competitive class system, the 
shape and boundaries of which remain obscure. It reflects the nation’s 
                                                            
 8. GORDON, supra note 5, at 3. 
 9. In this Article, the term “ideology” does not refer to a system of false beliefs. Rather, it 
refers to the essential, often unstated, assumptions in terms of which people understand and act in the 
world. This use of the term follows that of the French anthropologist Louis Dumont. See, e.g., LOUIS 
DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX 22 (1977). 
 10. See infra Part IV.A & B. 
 11. See infra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
 12. H.R. 2, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 13. See infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part IV.D. 
 15. See infra notes 258–62 and accompanying text. 
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intense anxiety about socioeconomic status in a universe where signs of 
status shift rapidly and are often murky. 
Part II of this Article discusses the vulnerability of poor women 
who lack full coverage for reproductive health care. These women are 
likely to receive inadequate or even harmful care. Additionally, poor 
women are likely to receive that care later than women with adequate 
health care coverage or with other economic resources. Section A recites 
the disturbing tale of an abortion clinic in Philadelphia that served mostly 
poor, minority women. The story involves reproductive care at its very 
worst. Section B considers, more generally, how the nation has wrested 
reproductive control from poor women in the United States. It then ex-
amines the complicated ideological strands that lie beneath reproductive 
health care available to poor women. 
Part III reviews responses to reproductive care for low-income 
women during the last decades of the twentieth century and provides the 
historical background needed for contextualizing the discussion in Part 
IV. Part IV reviews the role that abortion politics, and reproductive poli-
tics more generally, has played in the passage of, and in post-passage 
responses to, the health care reform law—the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act.16 This role has included federal and state challenges 
to public funding for family-planning services for poor women.17 
Finally, Part V elaborates on material introduced in Part II. It con-
siders assumptions about class that undergird opposition to health care 
reform. This Part argues that many assumptions that underlie opposition 
to health care reform also underlie opposition to public funding for abor-
tion and family-planning services. In short, the abortion politics that 
marked the last weeks of congressional debate prior to passage of the 
Affordable Care Act provided a platform upon which the nation could 
contemplate the benefits and detriments of more universal health care 
coverage. 
II. POVERTY AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 
The politics of reproduction includes the social and jurisprudential 
debate about contraception, sterilization, and infertility, as well as the 
debate surrounding abortion and family-planning laws. Reproductive 
politics directly affects family life, relationships between men and wom-
en, and the self-identity of women. It also directly affects the health of 
women and children, and, more specifically, may affect the timing of 
                                                            
 16. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C & D. 
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childbearing as well as the number of children that a woman will bear. 
And reproductive politics also encompasses a host of other significant 
issues. During the last half century, the politics of reproduction has 
served the interests of those concerned with broadening (or limiting) wel-
fare, challenging (or cementing) traditional understandings of gender and 
family, glorifying (or deflating) medicine as a profession, determining 
childbearing patterns, and cementing (or exposing) class and racial dis-
crimination.18 
Although reproductive politics affects virtually all women and most 
men, its consequences have been particularly harsh for poor women.19 
The politics of abortion provides a poignant example of how disparities 
in the national health care system are created on the basis of economic 
status, albeit in another name. On its face, discourse about abortion in the 
United States has concentrated primarily on the ontological status of the 
embryo and the fetus, as well as on the value and social implications of 
safeguarding a “traditional” vision of family.20 These issues would seem 
to render discourse about abortion similarly consequential for all socioe-
conomic groups. But the politics of abortion and reproduction reflect a 
set of assumptions about class deeply ingrained in the discourse. The 
result has not served poor people well. 
It is unsurprising that poor women are the primary victims of re-
productive politics. They are stigmatized not only because they are poor 
but also because they are poor women.21 Assumptions about poverty and 
the reproductive lives of poor women merge; each set of assumptions 
intensifies the other. American society has long envisioned that a wom-
an’s personal reproductive history is an essential parameter of her per-
sonhood. That notion has particular implications for poor women. Socie-
ty attributes poverty to women’s reproductive irresponsibility far more 
than men’s. Moreover, American society has viewed nontraditional fami-
ly choices among low-income people as evidence of “lower-class” irres-
ponsibility.22 In that context, society views poor women as “bad” moth-
                                                            
 18. See generally Christine Dehlendorf & Tracy Weitz, Access to Abortion Services: A Neg-
lected Health Disparity, 22 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 415 (2011). 
 19. See, e.g., infra notes 258–61. 
 20. Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 101, 104 (2003). 
 21. In addition, many of the women harmed by reproductive politics belong to minority groups. 
Maura Kelly, Regulating the Reproduction and Mothering of Poor Women: The Controlling Image 
of the Welfare Mother in Television News Coverage of Welfare Reform, 14 J. POVERTY 76, 77–79 
(2010). 
 22. Bernard Weiner, Danny Osborne & Udo Rudolph, An Attributional Analysis of Reactions 
to Poverty: The Political Ideology of the Giver and the Perceived Morality of the Receiver, 15 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 200 (2011). The authors reported: “[A]lthough low moti-
vation and poor money management skills are perceived to be the dominant causes of poverty for 
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ers.23 These assumptions reflect a wider tendency in American society to 
attribute poverty to irresponsibility in general and to laziness in particu-
lar.24 
Section A of this Part argues that poor women who are anxious to 
abort a pregnancy but who are without coverage for the procedure are 
profoundly vulnerable.25 The implications of the painful story described 
in section A are far-reaching insofar as the social and legal responses to 
abortion identified in that section are reflective of responses to reproduc-
tive care for poor women more generally.26 Section B of this Part consid-
ers the wider context within which law and society in the United States 
deprive poor women of control over their reproductive choices. 
A. The Worst of Care 
In early 2011, a Philadelphia judge accepted a grand jury report that 
recommended that the city’s district attorney prosecute Dr. Kermit Gos-
nell, his wife, and members of his staff for crimes allegedly committed at 
Gosnell’s abortion clinic, the Women’s Medical Society.27 The grand 
                                                                                                                                     
men, poverty among women is more often attributed to irresponsible reproductive patterns and fail-
ure to establish a traditional nuclear family.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 23. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, “Fetal Rights”: A New Assault on Feminism, in “BAD” MOTHERS: 
THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 285, 288 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri 
Umansky eds., 1998). 
 24. In the late 1700s, Benjamin Franklin explained that poverty is a consequence of irresponsi-
bility. SIMON P. NEWMAN, EMBODIED HISTORY: THE LIVES OF THE POOR IN EARLY PHILADELPHIA 
143 (2003). Franklin further explained that laziness also produces poverty. Id.; see also infra notes 
52–55. 
 25. See infra Part III.B (considering the Hyde Amendment and its consequences for poor 
women). 
 26. RAND CORP., DO PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD ABORTION INFLUENCE ATTITUDES 
TOWARD FAMILY PLANNING? (2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB5042/index1. 
html. The RAND analysis reported that by the end of the twentieth century, political responses to 
family-planning programs (including those offered pursuant to Title X of the Public Health Services 
Act) were “linked,” but only minimally, to the debate about abortion. Id. Yet, within a decade, the 
links between the debates about abortion and family planning became more charged. See, e.g., Chris-
tine Delargy, Rick Santorum to Mitch Daniels: Defund Planned Parenthood in Indiana, CBS NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20058486-503544.html?tag=mncol;lst; 
2 (reporting that former Indiana Senator Rick Santorum sought cuts in funding for Planned Parent-
hood and described Planned Parenthood as having “a very sordid history”); Amanda Marcotte, The 
War on Contraception, SLATE (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2011/02/18/ti 
tle_x_planned_parenthood_and_the_republican_war_on_contraception.html (noting that Indiana 
Republican Representatve Mike Pence introduced a bill aimed at prohibiting federal funding for 
clinics that provided family planning services—the “Title X Abortion Provider Prohibition Act”). 
 27. Presentment, In re County Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, Misc. No. 0009901-2008, C-17 
(2008), available at http://www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/PresentmentFinalWomensMedical. 
pdf; see also Report of the Grand Jury, In re County Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, Misc. No. 
0009901-2008, C-17 (2008) [hereinafter Grand Jury XXIII Report], available at http://www.phila. 
gov/districtattorney/PDFs/GrandJuryWomensMedical.pdf. In January 2011, Judge Renee Cardwell 
Hughes accepted the grand jury report and “refer[red] it to the Clerk of Court for filing as a public 
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jury called Gosnell’s clinic a “filthy fraud”28 and recommended that he 
be tried for several counts of murder and infanticide.29 
Gosnell ran the clinic for decades, but the state investigated the 
clinic’s abortion business—and its often disastrous consequences for 
poor women—only by accident, as part of a drug-trafficking investiga-
tion involving prescription medications.30 According to reports, patients 
at Gosnell’s clinic were overdosed with dangerous drugs.31 The grand 
jury described that Gosnell “spread venereal disease among [the patients] 
with infected instruments, perforated their wombs and bowels,” and 
caused at least two deaths.32 The grand jury also concluded that unli-
censed clinic employees routinely provided care to Gosnell’s patients.33 
Further, the grand jury reported “official neglect” by the state’s 
oversight agencies34 and asserted that “[e]ven nail salons in Pennsylvania 
are monitored more closely for patient safety.”35 Gosnell’s clinic seemed 
to specialize in late-term abortions. Many involved live births. If born 
alive, clinic employees allegedly killed the infants after birth, often by 
cutting the newborn’s spinal cord.36 Gosnell made a great deal of money 
from abortions performed on the women who came to his clinic: 
We estimate that Gosnell took in as much as $10,000 to $15,000 a 
night, mostly in cash, for a few hours of work performing abortions. 
And this amount does not include the money he made as one of the 
top Oxycontin prescribers in the state. The Women’s Medical So-
                                                                                                                                     
record.” Id.; see also, Larry Miller, Poor, Minorities Abortion Victims, NAT’L NEWSPAPER 
PUBLISHERS ASS’N (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nnpa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=4883&Itemid=63www.phillytrib.com. 
Discussion of the Women’s Medical Society in this Article reflects newspaper reports as well as 
the report of the grand jury. In January 2011, Gosnell was charged with eight counts of murder. 
Charges were also filed against nine of his employees. Sabrina Tavernise, Doctor Is Charged in 
Killing of Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at A15. At the time of publication, however, neither 
Gosnell nor the other potential defendants have been tried. Thus, this discussion does not, because it 
cannot, presume those defendants’ legal guilt. In October 2011, two Gosnell employees pled guilty 
to third-degree murder.  One pled guilty in connection with the death of a baby; the other pled guilty 
in connection with the death of a clinic patient. Associated Press, Pennsylvania:  Clinic Workers 
Plead Guilty to Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/ 
28/us/abortion-clinic-workers-plead-guilty-to-murder.html?_r=2&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y. 
 28. Grand Jury XXIII Report, supra note 27, at 1. 
 29. Id. at 219. 
 30. Id. at 19; Joseph Bottum, To Live and Die in Philadelphia: The Abortionist’s House of 
Horrors, WKLY. STANDARD (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/live-and-die-
philadelphia_537628.html; Miller, supra note 27. 
 31. Grand Jury XXIII Report, supra note 27, at 1, 23. 
 32. Id. at 1. 
 33. Id. at 27–30. 
 34. Id. at 137. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Bottum, supra note 30. 
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ciety stands as a monument to an absolute disdain for the health and 
safety of women, and in many cases of babies who were born alive 
in this filthy clinic.37 
Most of the clinic’s patients were poor women of color.38 Accord-
ing to a spokesperson for Philadelphia’s Black Women’s Health Project, 
the majority of women in Philadelphia who seek abortions are young, 
single, black, and very poor.39 Despite the fact that abortions are general-
ly legal,40 and that the procedure is usually routine,41 Medicaid offers 
almost no coverage for abortion in Pennsylvania.42 The severe limitation 
on the availability of Medicaid funds for abortions has furthered the de-
medicalization of the procedure, especially for poor women.43 As a con-
sequence, poor women seeking abortions must often delay having 
them.44 And when they do, they are “vulnerable to sub-standard provid-
ers” such as Gosnell and the other unlicensed workers employed at his 
clinic.45 
Gosnell was apparently conscious of his patients’ class status. Mid-
dle-class women who sought abortions at the Women’s Medical Society 
seemed to have received superior services. The grand jury reported that 
when “a white girl from the suburbs” came to the clinic, she received 
better and far more respectful treatment than that provided to the majori-
ty of patients.46 The grand jury report elaborated: 
Only in one class of cases did Gosnell exercise any real care with 
these dangerous sedatives. On those rare occasions when the patient 
was a white woman from the suburbs, Gosnell insisted that he be 
                                                            
 37. Grand Jury XXIII Report, supra note 27, at 23. 
 38. Miller, supra note 27. Gosnell is himself African-American. Id. 
 39. Id. The Black Women’s Health Project spokesperson reported that most of those seeking 
abortions in the city have incomes of less than $15,000 a year. Id. 
 40. See infra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. 
 41. Miller, supra note 27. 
 42. Pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, federal Medicaid funds are not generally available to 
cover abortion. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the Hyde Amendment’s re-
strictions on the use of federal funds for abortions and its exceptions in cases of threat to the preg-
nant woman’s life and, in certain years, also in cases of rape and incest). Pennsylvania is among the 
majority of states in which state funds cover very few abortions through Medicaid. Miller, supra 
note 27. Thirty-two states provide funds for Medicaid abortions only in cases of rape, incest, or 
endangerment of the life of the pregnant woman; two of these thirty-two states also provide funds in 
cases of fetal abnormality; and three offer funds in cases that threaten the pregnant woman with 
serious ill-health. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, STATE FUNDING FOR ABORTION 
UNDER MEDICAID 1 (2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf. 
 43. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Dehlendorf & Weitz, supra note 18, at 417. 
 45. Miller, supra note 27 (quoting Susan Schewel, Executive Director of the Women’s Medical 
Fund). 
 46. Grand Jury XXIII Report, supra note 27, at 61–62 (quoting testimony of Tina Baldwin); 
see also Miller, supra note 27. 
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consulted at every step. When an employee asked him why, he said 
it was “the way of the world.” 47 
The sad tale of Gosnell’s clinic echoes other related stories. Some 
are about abortion. Others are about limited access to medical care or 
about the state’s failure to take an interest in preventing stories such as 
that of the Women’s Medical Society. Others still are about color, class, 
and how health care is different for those with adequate resources and 
those with fewer resources. Certainly, the horrendous tale of Gosnell’s 
clinic illustrates the dismal reality for poor people, and poor women in 
particular, in a health care system rife with wide class disparities in 
access to care.48 
B. Poverty, Responsibility, and Control 
The story of Gosnell’s clinic, when viewed within the context of the 
politics of abortion, can be used by both pro-life and pro-choice adhe-
rents to support their respective positions. Indeed, at the start of its leng-
thy report, the Philadelphia grand jury that investigated Gosnell’s clinic 
acknowledged that the case would likely “be used by those on both sides 
of the abortion debate” to further their particular ideological ends.49 The 
report continued: 
We ourselves cover a spectrum of personal beliefs about the morali-
ty of abortion. For us as a criminal grand jury, however, the case is 
not about that controversy; it is about disregard of the law and dis-
dain for the lives and health of mothers and infants. We find com-
mon ground in exposing what happened here, and in recommending 
measures to prevent anything like this from ever happening again.50 
Thus, the grand jury recognized that the ramifications of the story extend 
beyond the politics of abortion. Fundamentally, it is a story of unequal 
access to health care and about the devastating consequences of that in-
equality for poor women. As described in the grand jury report, the case 
involved a clinic taking advantage of the vulnerable population of poor 
women for pecuniary motives.51 This conduct was made possible by a 
national health care system in which the needs of poor women are too 
often unmet. 
                                                            
 47. Grand Jury XXIII Report, supra note 27, at 7. 
 48. See generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003). 
 49. Grand Jury XXIII Report, supra note 27, at 1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally id. 
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Stigmatizing images of people living in poverty are illustrated by—
indeed, magnified through—images of poor women in need of reproduc-
tive care. The Gosnell case illustrates the deeply troubling implications 
of limiting access to reproductive health care for poor women in the 
United States.52 The perception that poverty is primarily the consequence 
of failed personal responsibility and individual laziness is deeply in-
grained in American social and political history. Since the nation’s 
founding, Americans have openly presumed that hard work and respon-
sible choices deter poverty.53 Benjamin Franklin was explicit about this 
presumption: “[I]f we are industrious, we shall never starve.”54 Franklin 
continued, “Laziness travels so slowly, that [p]overty soon overtakes 
him.”55 Such images suggest that those who live in poverty bear respon-
sibility for their socioeconomic status. 
That suggestion can be and has been used to excuse, if not justify, 
the political order’s deprivation of poor people’s control over their lives, 
including the deprivation of control over their reproductive health care 
choices.56 In the United States, a generalized, though often tacit, under-
standing of poverty as a consequence of personal irresponsibility and 
laziness merges with images of poor mothers as “bad” mothers.57 Such 
images buttress efforts to defund programs that provide reproductive care 
for low-income women.58 For the most part, bans on the use of state 
funds to cover reproductive care affect women eligible for Medicaid and 
various forms of public assistance.59 With a few exceptions, federal 
funds cannot be used to pay for abortions through Medicaid.60 About se-
venteen states use state funds to pay for medically necessary abortions 
for Medicaid beneficiaries.61 Other states’ Medicaid programs do not 
                                                            
 52. See Miller, supra note 27.  
 53. See infra Part V. 
 54. NEWMAN, supra note 24, at 143. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See infra Part V.B. 
 57. Similar patterns have marked the history of welfare in the U.S. For instance, in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, employers gave pensions only to “good” mothers—mostly wi-
dows.” Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umansky, Introduction to “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF 
BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA, supra note 23, at 1, 12. 
 58. See infra Part IV.B–D (describing laws defunding abortion and contraception for low-
income people). 
 59. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (considering the Hyde amendment); see also 
infra notes 206–10, 223–30 and accompanying text (considering H.R. 3 and the Pence Amendment). 
 60. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 61. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATE FUNDING OF ABORTIONS UNDER MEDICAID (2011), avail-
able at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?cat=10&ind=458. 
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cover abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or risk of death for the 
pregnant woman.62 
Poor women bear burdensome consequences due to the lack of pub-
lic funding for their reproductive care. Good reproductive health care is 
simply beyond the reach of many poor women.63 Consequently, the 
stigma that poverty imposes on poor women is intensified by images of 
women unable to control their reproductive and sexual lives. These im-
ages facilitate negative characterizations of poor women as bad mothers. 
Such characterizations, in turn, reinforce attributing blame for the pover-
ty and ill-health of poor women to the women themselves. Society thus 
absolves itself of responsibility for their poverty and accordingly justifies 
the state’s lack of support for the reproductive care of poor women.64 
Between Roe v. Wade,65 decided in 1973, and the end of the twen-
tieth century, a number of shifts in law and social perspective diminished 
Roe’s protection of the right to abortion for poor women. Roe offered 
reproductive choice to all women and addressed abortion as a medical 
matter.66 Developments during the subsequent decade—in particular the 
Hyde Amendment, which banned the use of federal funds to pay for most 
Medicaid abortion67—seemed aimed at demedicalizing abortion and 
shaping it as a right accessible only to middle- and upper-class women.68 
In effect, as society and the law have leaned toward limiting or banning 
abortion, the procedure itself has increasingly been dissociated from reg-
ular medical care.69 
                                                            
 62. Id. South Dakota’s Medicaid system covers abortion only when necessary to protect the 
pregnant woman’s life, and in the District of Columbia, Medicaid does not cover abortions. Id. 
 63. See Unintended Pregnancies a Sign of the Times, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2009, http://latimes 
blogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2009/05/unintended-pregnancies-a-sign-of-the-times.html. 
 64. See Pollitt, supra note 23, at 288–89. 
 65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 66. Id. at 165–66 (“[T]he right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to 
his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifi-
cations for intervention . . . . Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, 
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.”). 
 67. Passed in 1976, the Hyde Amendment has been renewed each year since that time. JESSICA 
ARONS & MADINA AGÉNOR, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND WOMEN OF 
COLOR, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 1, 7 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress. 
org/issues/2010/12/pdf/hyde_amendment.pdf. The original version of the Amendment is Depart-
ments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 
90 Stat. 1434 (1976). The 2010 version of the Amendment is Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, Division D, Title V, General Provisions, § 507, 123 Stat. 3034, 3280 
(2009). See infra note 103 and accompanying text for further information regarding the history and 
changing restrictions of the Amendment; see also MELODY ROSE, SAFE, LEGAL, AND 
UNAVAILABLE? 130–31 (2007). 
 68. Poor women continued to have abortions after the Hyde Amendment, but the burden on 
them increased enormously. See infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
 69. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
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Also, during the last decade of the twentieth century, social and le-
gal shifts—in particular, shifts in the dimensions of the nation’s welfare 
system—reflected a presumption that mothers on welfare were on public 
assistance because they had made bad choices and therefore were likely 
bad mothers. These presumptions were concretized in images of the 
“welfare mother” and the “welfare queen”—women on public assistance 
portrayed as “cheat[ing] the system.”70 Legal efforts to develop “welfare 
caps” or “child exclusion” programs exemplify the consequences of such 
conclusions about poor women.71 These programs preclude benefits for 
women who have additional children while receiving public assistance.72 
As abortion was demedicalized, it was simultaneously transformed 
into a consumer right—available to those able to afford it. That shift was 
cemented by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. McRae,73 which 
upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. Defunding Medi-
caid abortions74 stigmatized poor women generally, and poor pregnant 
women specifically, by limiting their reproductive choices.75 For middle-
class women, the incidents of reproduction—whether to get pregnant, 
when to have a child, when to end a pregnancy, and even whether to pay 
third parties to participate in the reproductive process—are matters of 
individual choice.76 As described by Rickie Solinger, poor women are 
consistently deprived of the same choices: 
In the minds of many people, legitimate pregnancies have now be-
come a class privilege, reserved for women with resources. Other 
women—those without resources—who get pregnant and stay preg-
nant are often regarded as making bad choices. As middle-class 
women have claimed reproductive privacy for themselves . . . they 
have too frequently allowed the fertile bodies of women without 
                                                                                                                                     
In a report about Kermit Gosnell’s Women’s Medical Society (described supra in Part II.A), Ka-
tha Pollitt quoted a spokesperson for the Women’s Law Project in Pennsylvania and noted that 
Pennsylvania lawmakers’ attention focused on banning abortion rather than on “abortion as health 
care.” Katha Pollitt, Dr. Kermit Gosnell’s Horror Show, THE NATION, Jan. 27, 2011, http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/158089/dr-kermit-gosnells-horror-show (quoting Carol Tracy of the 
Women’s Law Project). 
 70. Kelly, supra note 21, at 78 (quoting RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW 
THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 155 
(2001)). 
 71. See infra Part III.D (considering welfare reform during the 1990s). 
 72. The programs reflect and reinforce negative images of low-income mothers generally and, 
even more often, of low-income Black mothers specifically. Kelly, supra note 21, at 78. 
 73. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (validating the Hyde Amendment, which precluded 
use of federal funds for “medically necessary” abortions through Medicaid). 
 74. See supra note 67 (describing the Hyde Amendment). 
 75. RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 201 (2005). 
 76. Id. at 217. 
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private resources to be assessed and condemned in the public 
sphere.77 
III. LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY: POOR WOMEN, ABORTION, FAMILY 
PLANNING, AND WELFARE IN THE LATE-TWENTIETH CENTURY 
This Part describes efforts to deprive poor women of coverage for 
good reproductive health care. A host of twentieth and twenty-first cen-
tury reproductive policies—from funding limits on Medicaid abortions to 
policies encouraging or even coercing women to undergo steriliza-
tion78—has consistently limited the reproductive choices of poor women. 
Women without private resources who are denied state-funded reproduc-
tive care are compelled to have children they do not want or to spend 
money they do not have. And poor women, urged to have fewer children 
by state policies that limit welfare benefits or otherwise discourage re-
production, bear fewer children than they would choose or experience a 
harder time supporting the children they do have.79 
Section A provides a short summary of the Supreme Court’s recog-
nition of the constitutional right to birth control and abortion during the 
1960s and 1970s. Sections B and C describe the processes through which 
the rights to abortion and family planning (including contraception) were 
whittled away during the last two decades of the twentieth century, espe-
cially for low-income women. Section D of this Part explains how the 
1990s welfare reform exacerbated the consequences of the federal gov-
ernment’s defunding abortion and limiting funding for family planning. 
A. A Right to Contraception and Abortion and the Limits of that Right: 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey 
This section discusses social and legal developments regarding 
women’s reproductive care that have affected poor women in particular. 
It begins by reviewing Supreme Court decisions that have addressed—
and sometimes guaranteed—the right to use contraception and the right 
to abortion. The cases span the period between the 1965 decision, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,80 and the 1992 decision, Planned Parenthood of 
                                                            
 77. Id. 
 78. See Patrick J. Ryan, “Six Blacks from Home”: Childhood, Motherhood, and Eugenics in 
America, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 253 (2007) (considering the history of eugenics in the United States 
throughout the twentieth century). 
 79. See id. Ryan illustrates the continuing force of eugenics policies into the second half of the 
twentieth century by noting a 1972 recommendation of California’s welfare advisory board “that 
women who gave birth to more than two children while unmarried be declared unfit parents and be 
required to relinquish any subsequent children to the state.” Id. at 274. 
 80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.81 The section then examines limits 
on the right to abortion and contraception that resulted from restrictions 
on the use of Medicaid funding and from public-funding cuts for other 
forms of reproductive care. 
In 1965, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute that crimina-
lized the use of birth control as well as counseling or assisting others in 
that use.82 The Court grounded its decision in the “penumbras” surround-
ing “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.”83 The case specifically 
granted the right to use birth control to married couples, and the decision 
rested on a traditional vision of the spousal relationship as the virtual 
exemplar of a “private” relationship.84 
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court broadened 
Griswold’s holding to include unmarried people.85 In Eisenstadt, the 
Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and concluded that “[i]f under Griswold the distribution of contra-
ception to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to 
unmarried persons would be equally impermissible.”86 The decision was 
particularly significant because it abandoned a vision of families as 
communal wholes and replaced it with a vision in which family members 
became individuals, similar to actors in the commercial marketplace. The 
right to contraception defined in Eisenstadt is a right to autonomous con-
trol of one’s own reproductive decisions. In significant part, that vision 
remains in place. But it has been explicitly limited in the context of abor-
tion and implicitly limited in reference to poor women.87 
One year after Eisenstadt, in Roe, the Court entertained a case that 
involved abortion, rather than contraception, and the reproductive rights 
of women in particular.88 The Court’s decision has been widely inter-
preted, applauded, criticized, dissected, and limited by subsequent cases. 
Roe involved a challenge to a state statute that criminalized abortion (ex-
cept when necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman). The Court 
invalidated the statute in light of a woman’s “right to privacy”—a right 
which the Court located in the “Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of per-
sonal liberty and restrictions on state action” or, following the lower 
court’s determination, in the “Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights 
                                                            
 81. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion). 
 82. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83. 
 83. Id. at 484. 
 84. Id. at 495. 
 85. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 86. Id. at 453. 
 87. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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to the people.”89 The Court elaborated on, and in part limited, the right 
through reference to a trimester framework. During the first trimester, the 
Court left the right to abortion to “the medical judgment of the pregnant 
woman’s attending physician.”90 Roe provided that by the third trimester 
of a pregnancy (a period equated with fetal viability), states could limit 
the right to abortion “except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”91 
The decades following the Court’s decision in Roe were characte-
rized by continuing efforts to limit or undermine the right it granted. In 
1992, the Supreme Court issued its most significant statement subsequent 
to Roe about the constitutional right to abortion. In Casey, the Court rea-
ligned the contours of the right to abortion but did not, as many thought 
might happen, eviscerate that right. Casey involved a challenge to a 
Pennsylvania statute that limited the right to abortion by mandating, 
among other things, waiting periods, a requirement that the husband of a 
married pregnant woman be notified of her intent to abort, and that a 
woman seeking an abortion be given specific information before con-
senting to the procedure.92 The Court expressly preserved the “constitu-
tional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate her preg-
nancy,” but it upheld most of the statute’s provisions.93 Significantly, the 
Court replaced the trimester framework that governed Roe, devising one 
with two stages separated by the point of fetal viability.94 Further, the 
Court justified state interference with the right to abortion unless that 
interference imposed an “undue burden” on the pregnant woman.95 The 
Court defined that burden as “a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”96 
In sum, the cases that followed Roe reshaped, reimagined, and in 
significant part, limited a woman’s right to abortion. Casey altered Roe’s 
approach but preserved the basic right. Other abortion cases decided in 
Roe’s wake concerned a variety of specific issues, including the right of 
a minor to have abortion,97 limits on the type of abortion that women and 
                                                            
 89. Id. at 153. 
 90. Id. at 164. 
 91. Id. at 164–65. 
 92. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (joint opinion). 
 93. Id. at 869. The Court invalidated a provision in the state statute that required spousal notifi-
cation. Id. at 898. 
 94. Id. at 870−71. 
 95. Id. at 877. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (requiring a judicial bypass option for a 
minor in a state with a parental consent requirement for the minor to have an abortion). 
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their physicians may choose,98 and the right to public funding for abor-
tion.99 The next section considers abortion jurisprudence about this last 
matter. It exclusively focuses on the legal changes and proposed changes 
that diminish the value of the right to abortion for low-income women in 
particular. 
B. The Hyde Amendment and Harris v. McRae 
Soon after the Court’s 1973 decision in Roe, members of Congress 
with disparate interests joined together to prohibit the use of federal 
funding for abortions through Medicaid.100 The group included some 
straightforward abortion opponents, those concerned with imposing lim-
its on federal spending, and others who sought political gain by siding 
with abortion opponents.101 The result was the Hyde Amendment,102  
named for Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, an original sponsor of 
the Amendment and a staunch opponent of abortion. The Amendment, 
first promulgated in 1976, restricts the use of federal funds for abortions 
obtained through Medicaid.103 Congress has reenacted it every year since 
                                                            
 98. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (validating the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003). 
 99. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the federal law banning use of 
federal funds for abortions through Medicaid); see also infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text 
(considering McRae). 
 100. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the Hyde Amendment). 
 101. ROSE, supra note 67, at 129. 
 102. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, Division D, Title V, 
General Provisions, § 507, 123 Stat. 3034, 3280 (2009). The original version of the Hyde Amend-
ment, passed in 1976, is Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976). The Amendment is a rider attached to annual 
Medicaid appropriations bills. 
 103. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act, § 209. 
The Hyde Amendment’s limitations on federal funds for abortion were first implemented on Au-
gust 4, 1977, when a New York federal district court’s injunction was lifted in response to a Su-
preme Court ruling. See Jon F. Merz, Catherine A. Jackson & Jacob A. Klerman, A Review of Abor-
tion Policy: Legality, Medicaid Funding, and Parental Involvement, 1967–1994, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 1, 7–8 (1995). The Amendment was enjoined for several months in 1980 until the Supreme 
Court validated it. Id. (discussing the immediate postenactment history of the Amendment, including 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decline of a rehearing on September 19, 
1980, when funding was again restricted). See also Willard Cates, Jr., The Hyde Amendment in Ac-
tion: How Did the Restriction of Federal Funds for Abortion Affect Low-Income Women?, 246 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1109 (1981). 
The original version of the Hyde Amendment passed in 1976 provided an exception only for abor-
tions required to save the life of the pregnant woman. ROSE, supra note 67, at 129. Rose outlined 
changes in exceptions to the Hyde Amendment during subsequent years. Id. at 130–31. Since then, 
additional exceptions (e.g., in cases of rape or incest) were added, reshaped, and eliminated, and the 
matter of appropriate exceptions has been subject to continuing debate. In 1977, Congress expanded 
exceptions to include cases of rape and incest and cases in which the health of the pregnant woman 
was threatened. Id. Then in 1979, the exception to safeguard a woman’s health was removed from 
the Amendment. Id. at 130. A 1981 change in the Hyde Amendment—eliminating exceptions for 
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1976, as part of the process of appropriations for the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (now called the Department of Health 
and Human Services) or by a joint resolution.104 
The Hyde Amendment served a number of ideological ends. Simi-
lar to other post-Roe attempts by lawmakers to limit abortion,105 the 
Hyde Amendment allowed members of Congress to satisfy a powerful, 
vocal pro-life constituency while protecting access to abortion for mid-
dle- and upper-class women.106 The Amendment served pro-life adhe-
rents’ interest in limiting or precluding abortion altogether. It also re-
flected the notions that poor people lack individual responsibility107 and 
that poor women—and poor pregnant women, in particular—are prone to 
irresponsible behavior.108 Defunding abortions for poor women does not 
save money, and thus, proponents cannot justify it on budgetary 
grounds.109 In fact, the federal government’s refusal to pay for Medicaid 
abortions is expensive.110 Justification for the refusal seems to rest on a 
pro-life position or on disdain for poor women who become pregnant 
unintentionally. 
The Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment in McRae.111 In a 
5–4 decision, the Court concluded that wide restrictions on the use of 
federal funds to support Medicaid abortions did not violate a poor wom-
an’s right to an abortion.112  The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that 
the Amendment interfered with their Fourteenth Amendment right to 
liberty, as delineated in Roe and subsequent cases.113 In effect, the Court 
proclaimed that poor women do not have the same options as women 
                                                                                                                                     
rape and incest—reflected newly elected President Reagan’s pro-life platform. Id. at 131. After Bill 
Clinton’s election in 1992, exceptions for cases involving pregnancies resulting from rape or incest 
were reinserted. Id. The 2009 version, promulgated during the first year of Barack Obama’s presi-
dency, included exceptions for rape, incest, and endangerment to the woman’s life. Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2010, § 507. 
 104. McRae, 448 U.S. at 302; ARONS & AGÉNOR, supra note 67, at 7. 
 105. Among these are state laws requiring a pregnant minor to inform her parents before abort-
ing a pregnancy. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (considering a challenge to a Mas-
sachusetts statute requiring pregnant minors seeking abortions to obtain consent from both parents, 
with an option to seek judicial approval for an abortion if parental consent was not forthcoming, and 
requiring a judicial “bypass” option to allow minor girls to go to court without informing their par-
ents). 
 106. DEBORAH R. MCFARLANE & KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF FERTILITY CONTROL 9 
(2001). 
 107. This notion has been widely accepted in the United States since the nation’s founding. See 
supra note 24 and accompanying text (quoting Benjamin Franklin). 
 108. MCFARLANE & MEIER, supra note 106, at 11–12. 
 109. See infra notes 233–39 and accompanying text. 
 110. MCFARLANE & MEIER, supra note 106, at 12. 
 111. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 312. 
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with resources but that the government is not responsible for their pover-
ty. Consequently, defunding Medicaid abortions does not interfere with 
the constitutional rights of a poor, pregnant woman anxious to terminate 
her pregnancy. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, explained: 
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to ter-
minate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the peri-
phery of the due process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does 
not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a con-
stitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of 
the full range of protected choices . . . . [A]lthough government may 
not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her free-
dom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. In-
digence falls in the latter category. The financial constraints that re-
strict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitu-
tionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of govern-
mental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indi-
gence. Although Congress has opted to subsidize medically neces-
sary services generally [through the Medicaid program], but not cer-
tain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde 
Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range 
of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abor-
tion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no 
health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded that the Hyde 
Amendment impinges on the constitutionally protected freedom of 
choice recognized in Wade.114 
Rhetoric surrounding limitations imposed by the Hyde Amendment 
reinvigorated an ideology that presumes responsibility for poverty lies 
with bad choices made by those who live in poverty. For instance, Sena-
tor Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah) invoked the irresponsibility of a poor woman 
who failed to save enough money to pay for a wanted abortion: “[T]here 
is nothing to prevent [a poor woman] . . . from either exercising in-
creased self-restraint, or from sacrificing on some item or other for a 
month or two to afford [her] own abortion.”115 Often enough, however, 
Hatch’s advice that poor women in need of an abortion might responsi-
bly “sacrifice[] on some item” has been belied by reality.116 
                                                            
 114. Id. at 316–17. 
 115. SOLINGER, supra note 75, at 202 (citing and quoting from 124 CONG. REC. 31, 900 
(1978)). 
 116. See infra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
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In the same year that the Supreme Court decided McRae, a federal 
district court in Connecticut reported117 that more than a third of poor 
women in Connecticut in need of “medically necessary” abortions were 
“unable to raise the funds” required to pay for them “and were thus 
forced to carry their abnormal pregnancies to term.”118 Even more, many 
poor women who have managed to locate the necessary funds have been 
unable to do so without a lapse in time between the decision to end the 
pregnancy and the abortion. The later an abortion is performed, the 
greater the risk and the cost.119 The district court in Women’s Health Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Maher reported some of the consequences of the Hyde 
Amendment for poor women: 
[Those who did] obtain funds to pay for therapeutic abortions [did 
that] only with some sacrifice—not paying rent or utility bills, 
pawning household goods, diverting food and clothing money, or 
journeying to another state to obtain lower rates or fraudulently use 
a relative’s insurance policy. In a few cases, some patients were dri-
ven to theft.120 
In effect, the Hyde Amendment and McRae121 facilitated a process 
that recast abortion as a commercial good rather than a medical proce-
dure. In subsequent years, legislatures further demedicalized abortion for 
all women by displacing physicians’ judgments with laws that dictated 
what abortion procedures could be used in practice,122 and by regulating 
decisions that resulted in treating abortion facilities differently than other 
health care clinics.123 After Roe, many abortion facilities were physically 
separated from other health care services. This pattern further removed 
abortion from the world of mainstream medicine.124 
                                                            
 117. Women’s Health Servs., Inc. v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725, 731 (D. Conn. 1980), vacated, 
636 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the government has no constitutional obligation to pay 
for abortions for poor women). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Dehlendorf & Weitz, supra note 18, at 416. Delay is especially consequential for 
health and cost if the procedure is pushed into the second trimester. SOLINGER, supra note 75, at 202 
(reporting that delaying abortion carries a significant risk). The risk of mortalities related to abortion 
increases each week after eight weeks of gestation. Dehlendorf & Weitz, supra note 18, at 417. Still, 
carrying a pregnancy to term is more risky than having an abortion “regardless of the gestational 
age.”  Id. 
 120. Maher, 482 F. Supp. at 731 n.9 (citing Defendant’s Ex. B-1, Transcript of Hearing, at 61–
66, 96). 
 121. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 122. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003, a federal law identifying illegal abortion procedures and thus displacing physician 
judgment). 
 123. Bottum, supra note 30. 
 124. This pattern has also facilitated picketing abortion clinics and has thus furthered the stig-
matization of all women seeking abortions. Alison Norris et al., Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptuali-
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The consequences of abortion’s demedicalization have been hardest 
on poor women without coverage for abortion. They more often than not 
depend on public clinics for care. They wait longer before seeking an 
abortion provider than they would if abortions were available through 
Medicaid. And they are more likely to use substandard providers than 
women with private resources.125 
Some states provide state funding for Medicaid abortions.126 In the 
states that do not, most poor women seeking an abortion are often com-
pelled to postpone the procedure while seeking money to pay for it.127 
The postponement increases the risks and costs of the procedure. A 
second-trimester abortion costs significantly more than a first-trimester 
abortion.128 
Moreover, cuts in public funding for family-planning services have 
seriously exacerbated the burden that the Hyde Amendment places on 
poor women.129 Those cuts began a decade after promulgation of Title X, 
which funded reproductive health care at a network of clinics throughout 
the country. Cuts have followed every decade since.130 
C. Family Planning 
The Supreme Court found a constitutional right to contraception in 
1965 in Griswold.131 In the aftermath of Griswold and Eisenstadt132 in 
1972, birth control became legally available everywhere in the U.S.133 In 
                                                                                                                                     
zation of Constituents, Causes, and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S49, S52 (2011). 
See also infra note 145 (discussing Title X regulation changes). 
 125. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
little had changed for poor women seeking abortions since Congress first promulgated the Hyde 
Amendment in the late 1970s. 
 126. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 61. 
 127. Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor 
Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 14–15 (2007) (“Poor women take up 
to three weeks longer than other women to obtain an abortion.”); see also Marc Kaufman, Unwanted 
Pregnancies Rise for Poor Women, WASH. POST, May 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/04/AR2006050400820.html (reporting that on average poor women 
seeking abortions are delayed six days more than women with greater resources). 
 128. See Dehlendorf & Weitz, supra note 18, at 416; see also Boonstra, supra note 127, at 15 
(reporting that in 2001 an abortion obtained at ten weeks gestation cost $370 on average, by fourteen 
weeks the cost was $650, and by twenty weeks it was $1,042). 
 129. See infra Part IV.C. 
 130. ROSE, supra note 67, at 134–35, 176. 
 131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 132. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 133. Before Griswold, contraception was available, but not legally, in states that prohibited the 
use or sale of contraception. For instance, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), a case challenging 
Connecticut’s birth control statute, the Supreme Court identified only one prosecution pursuant to 
the law during a period of many decades. The Court thus dismissed the case because it was not ripe. 
Id. The Court noted that many Connecticut pharmacies sold contraception despite the state. Id. at 
502. 
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the same year that the Court decided Griswold, President Johnson’s State 
of the Union address voiced concern about increases in population, and 
for the first time, the federal government funded some contraceptive care 
through Johnson’s War on Poverty.134 Five years after Johnson’s expres-
sion of concern and the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold, Congress 
passed Title X of the Public Health Service Act with bipartisan sup-
port.135 Title X offered federal funding for comprehensive family-
planning services.136 
When President Nixon signed the bill, he promised that no woman 
would be deprived of family planning “‘because of her economic condi-
tion.’”137 The law provided for federal and state funding of clinics that 
offered family-planning services.138 As a result, low-income women 
gained access to contraceptives139 and to “preventive health services,” 
including screening for cervical and breast cancers, testing for sexually 
transmitted diseases, pregnancy diagnosis and counseling, and later HIV 
counseling, testing, and referral.140 Title X precludes the use of federal 
funds for abortions, and it prohibits the distribution of federal funds to 
any program providing abortion services.141 
Over the years, government regulations and administrative interpre-
tations of Title X have changed.142 At first, administrative practice per-
mitted those receiving the funds to counsel clients about abortion and to 
refer them to abortion providers.143 Later, such counseling and referral 
were even required.144 In 1988, however, new regulations promulgated 
by the Public Health Service prohibited any grantee from engaging in 
abortion counseling or referrals for abortions.145 The 1988 regulations 
                                                            
 134. GORDON, supra note 5, at 289. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 
Stat. 1504 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6 (2006)). 
 137. GORDON, supra note 5, at 289 (quoting MARTHA C. WARD, POOR WOMEN, POWERFUL 
MEN: AMERICA’S GREAT EXPERIMENT IN FAMILY PLANNING 68 (1986)). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6. 
 139. Title X Family Planning, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov 
/opa/familyplanning/index.html (last visited June 30, 2011). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6. 
 142. State of N.Y. v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 404–06 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
 143. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PROGRAM INCENTIVES FOR 
PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES (1976) and U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6 
(1981)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1988); see also Scott E. Johnson, Rust v. Sullivan: The Supreme Court 
Upholds the Title X Abortion-Counseling Gag Rule, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 211–15 (1991); Alexan-
dra A. E. Shapiro, Note, Title X, the Abortion Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
1737, 1739–40 (1990). “Gag rule” refers to the label opponents of the new regulations gave them, 
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required an organization receiving Title X funds to ensure that any use of 
those funds would be physically and financially separate from prohibited 
activities related to abortion.146 
The broad array of family-planning services promised by Title X 
has not always been actualized. Although every state developed at least 
one Title X clinic, some states have relied far less heavily on Title X 
funds than others.147 Even in those states that have favored the use of 
public funds for contraceptive services, approval has sometimes required 
the invocation of themes that appealed to conservative—and even to rac-
ist148—state legislators. 
Progressives in Louisiana concluded that they could succeed in 
creating family-planning clinics for poor women only by relying on rac-
ist claims that “family planning would lower welfare costs as well as the 
birth rate among [B]lacks.”149 In that context, it is unsurprising that poor 
women—and especially poor Black women in Louisiana and other 
                                                                                                                                     
“since they ‘gagged’ doctors with respect to their ability to discuss abortion with their patients.” 
Johnson, supra, at n.18. 
The Department of Health and Human Services established the new regulations in response to a 
1987 request by then President Ronald Reagan. Id. at 212. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld, 
among other provisions in the new regulations, the government’s conditioning federal funds for 
family planning on the stipulation that recipients not offer counseling about or referrals for abortion. 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1992). Finding ambiguous both the plain language and legislative 
history of the Title X statute, the Court deferred to the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ new 
interpretation, even if it represented a “sharp break from the Secretary’s prior construction of the 
statute.” Id. at 186. The Court found the Secretary’s justifications for the change sufficient. Among 
the Court’s justifications was the Secretary’s “determin[ation] that the new regulations are more in 
keeping with the original intent of the statute, are justified by client experience under the prior poli-
cy, and are supported by a shift in attitude against the ‘elimination of unborn children by abortion.’” 
Id. at 187. Second Circuit Judge Kearse, dissenting in the case below, noted that there was no sug-
gestion that the “Secretary’s about-face” was needed, and observed that “at oral argument of this 
case in the district court, the Secretary admitted that his new regulations were the result of a shift in 
the political climate.” Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 418. 
In his dissent in Rust v. Sullivan, Supreme Court Justice Blackmun stated that “[t]he manipulation 
of the doctor-patient dialogue achieved through the Secretary’s regulations is clearly an effort ‘to 
deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make.’. . . As such it vi-
olates the Fifth Amendment.” 500 U.S. at 219 (internal citation omitted). He also stated, “The denial 
of [the freedom to choose] is not a consequence of poverty but of the Government’s ill-intentioned 
distortion of information it has chosen to provide.” Id. at 217. 
 146. 53 Fed. Reg. 2,922, 2,945 (Feb. 2, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.9); see also Rust, 500 
U.S. 173 (upholding the regulations). 
 147. MCFARLANE & MEIER, supra note 106, at 80–81 (noting that in Arkansas 44% of public 
funding for contraceptive and other family-planning services came from Title X funds; in New 
Hampshire, however, the percentage was much lower (only 16%)). 
 148. GORDON, supra note 5, at 290 (quoting racist state legislators as having openly approved 
of providing birth control to Black women for eugenic ends). 
 149. Id. at 289. 
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Southern states with similar conservative views—have suspected the mo-
tives of those running birth-control clinics in their communities.150 
Although Title X was an impressive effort to give poor women 
more control over their reproductive lives, that aim was deflected almost 
from the start. Soon after implementing Title X programs, the federal 
government limited their funding.151 Even more, eugenic undertones 
haunted the actualization of Title X family-planning clinics with a dis-
proportionate placement of clinics in communities of color.152 Further, 
the clinics’ reliance on long-term forms of birth control (e.g., IUDs and 
sterilization) instead of short-term forms (e.g., diaphragms or the pill) 
may well have diminished rather than strengthened the reproductive con-
trol of poor women.153 
Public support moved even further away from the reproductive 
needs of poor women during the 1990s.154 Many legal measures that de-
prived poor women of reproductive control were enacted. For example, 
some states paid poor women not to have children (e.g., offering cash to 
poor women for using long-term contraception) or undermined their fi-
nancial security if they had additional children (e.g., family caps).155 
Such measures reflected a deeply negative sentiment about poor wom-
en’s reproductive lives embedded in the decade’s welfare reform ef-
forts.156 As Rickie Solinger argued: 
[In the 1990s], judges and legislators defined poor women’s repro-
ductive behavior as both insubordinate (resistant to authority) and 
expensive. The valuable reproduction of middle-class women, 
whether inside or outside of marriage, whether subordinate or insu-
bordinate, has been subsidized by tax laws that allowed deductions 
for dependent children, child care, mortgage, and other family ex-
penses. But politicians worked hard in the 1990s to “end welfare as 
we know it,” by which many of them meant to stop “rewarding” 
poor women for having babies . . . .157 
                                                            
 150. Id. at 290. Even so, the clinics successfully provide basic reproductive care for poor wom-
en and reduced the mortality rate of infants and mothers. Id. (reporting that in Louisiana in the first 
half of the 1970s, infant mortality fell by 26% and maternity mortality fell by over 50%). 
 151. Id. at 291. 
 152. Id. at 290. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See infra notes 161–71 and accompanying text (discussing the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). 
 155. SOLINGER, supra note 75, at 223. 
 156. See infra notes 172–75. 
 157. SOLINGER, supra note 75, at 223 (quoting Linda McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 
47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 415 (1996)). 
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At that time, Medicaid eligibility and health care insurance declined 
for women of childbearing age.158 During the same decade, abortion 
among poor women increased.159 Even a decade later, Solinger reported 
that “the poorest women in the United States have the worst access to 
birth control and the highest abortion rates.”160 That inverse correlation is 
likely not accidental, and shifts in welfare laws in the 1990s probably 
exacerbated these consequences. The next section more fully considers 
the 1990s welfare reform, and the connections between that reform and 
laws that limit reproductive health care for poor women. 
D. Welfare Reform in the Mid-1990s 
A number of intertwined motivations animated the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA), 
which reformed the nation’s welfare system.161 The PRA placed startling 
limits on poor women’s reproductive choices. At least some of the justi-
fications for welfare reform at the end of the twentieth century relied on 
a stereotype of poor, single mothers as responsible for a wide array of 
social problems, including crime, riots, and poverty.162 Reform of the 
nation’s welfare system during this period rested on, among other things, 
an interest in channeling the reproductive lives of poor people.163 The 
PRA placed a double bind on poor women who became pregnant unin-
tentionally. Under the new welfare rules described in this section, poor 
women receiving welfare would in effect become even poorer with the 
birth of each additional child. But restrictions on the use of federal fund-
ing for abortion through Medicaid seemed to encourage more, rather than 
fewer, births among poor women.164 
The PRA replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children165—an 
entitlement program promulgated as part of the Social Security Act of 
1936—with a program dependent on block grants to states. The PRA 
mandated that states use the grants for short-term assistance to poor 
                                                            
 158. Id. at 219. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 162. Ladd-Taylor & Umansky, supra note 57, at 17. 
 163. RONALD J. ANGEL, LAURA LEIN & JANE HENRICI, POOR FAMILIES IN AMERICA’S HEALTH 
CARE CRISIS 14 (2006). 
 164. Dehlendorf & Weitz, supra note 18, at 415, 417. 
 165. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1)(1996). Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
guaranteed income support to families who met income eligibility criteria. AFDC did permit states 
to set benefit levels. See id. § 233.20(a)(2). See also Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, 
and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 558 
(1999). 
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families through the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
program.166 Although the PRA gave states significant room to design 
programs within their boundaries,167 the new program stressed the impor-
tance of work and marriage.168 The PRA conditioned receipt of welfare 
on seeking and finding work, and it limited individuals to five years of 
welfare.169 The PRA extended states the option to establish the terms of 
eligibility and the level of benefits offered to welfare recipients.170 This 
option included authority to set family caps within a state.171 
Previously under Aid to Families with Dependent Children, benefit 
allocation depended on the number of children in that family.172 Placing 
family caps on welfare reflected a congressional belief that welfare pay-
ments encouraged childbirth among recipients173 and that family caps 
would encourage poor women to limit childbearing.174 By the start of the 
twenty-first century, two dozen states had promulgated similar rules.175 
But TANF did not provide a mechanism for states or the federal govern-
ment to determine whether family caps had any effect on rates of repro-
duction among those receiving benefits through the program.176 As a re-
sult, there is little evidence through which to assess the system’s conse-
quences.177 The evidence that does exist does not support the presump-
tion that family caps limit childbearing among poor women.178 
                                                            
 166. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), part of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title I, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 
2105, 2110-13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–617 (1996)). The program limits assistance using fed-
eral funds under the program to sixty months in a lifetime. 42 U.S.C. § 608. 
 167. Id. § 601(a). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. § 607. The PRA required welfare recipients to engage in acceptable work activities 
within twenty-four months. The law set a lifetime limit of five years on welfare benefits for any 
person. Id. § 608(a)(7). However, the PRA allowed states to establish a shorter period of time for the 
receipt of benefits or to provide benefits for a longer period in the event of a family “hardship.” Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, § 103, 408(a)(7)(C). The law, however, provided that exceptions allowing receipt of 
benefits beyond five years cannot exceed 20% of the state’s welfare cases. Id. §§ 103, 
408(a)(7)(C)(ii). See also Benjamin L. Weiss, Single Mothers’ Equal Right to Parent: A Fourteenth 
Amendment Defense Against Forced-Labor Welfare “Reform,” 15 L. & INEQUALITY 215, 217 n.5 
(1997). 
 170. See supra note 165. 
 171. Cashin, supra note 165, at 561 n.32. 
 172. Susan Frellich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: “Personal Responsi-
bility,” “Family Values,” and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155, 159 (1996). 
 173. GORDON, supra note 5, at 351. 
 174. Diana Romero & Madina Agénor, US Fertility Prevention as Poverty Prevention, 19 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 355, 359 (2009). 
 175. Id. at 356. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 359. 
 178. Id. 
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The PRA encouraged the narrative that poor women are unable to 
control their reproductive lives and are unable to raise their children suc-
cessfully. Yet, the Act exacerbated the difficulties facing poor women 
anxious to spend more time with their families, while laws defunding 
Medicaid abortions made it hard for them to limit births. In further irony, 
although those who favored family caps when Congress promulgated the 
PRA were generally opposed to abortion,179 poor women facing a family 
cap might consider aborting unintended pregnancies.180 Perhaps reflect-
ing the general anti-abortion sentiment of those who favored family caps, 
the PRA created bonuses that states could compete for by limiting births 
among unmarried women. Before it could qualify for the bonus, a state 
had to show that its rate of abortion was lower than it had been in 
1995.181 The PRA further required that those receiving welfare benefits 
find paying work. But that requirement seems to have discouraged child-
birth and made abortion a reasonable option for women facing unwanted 
pregnancies182—an option that most family-cap advocates and the law 
itself disfavored.183 
Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, the federal government 
had openly curtailed many of the reproductive health care benefits that 
the previous two decades had brought to poor women. Lawmakers’ com-
fort with that trend deepened in the first years of the twenty-first cen-
tury—especially after passage of the Affordable Care Act, as discussed 
in Part IV. 
IV. COMPROMISING REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE ONCE MORE: 
PASSAGE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Even as the nation witnessed the advent of health care reform in 
2010, Congress and President Obama agreed to limit reproductive care 
for poor women under the new law. In particular, they agreed to restrict 
the use of federal funds for abortion under the Affordable Care Act. The 
Act184 is a modest effort at reform insofar as it preserves most of the in-
stitutions that shaped American health care coverage before its passage. 
                                                            
 179. Appleton, supra note 172, at 85. 
 180. Id. at 168. 
 181. Id. at 175. 
 182. Id. at 167. 
 183. Id. at 157–58. 
 184. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. 
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But if the law is implemented,185 it will significantly expand access to 
health care.186 
Yet, the Act’s passage involved a series of significant compromises 
that limited the reach of the reform, even with regard to expanding 
access to care. In large part, the victims of those compromises were poor 
women. As a result of both negotiations between President Obama and 
Congress before the Act’s passage and congressional backlash after its 
passage, poor women concerned about receiving an equal right to full 
reproductive health care did not fare well.187 
Negotiations between the President and members of the 111th Con-
gress resulted in a compromise that reinforced the demedicalization of 
abortion. The consequences, as ever, would be felt with particular harsh-
ness by poor women. Moreover, less than a year after passage of the Act, 
the 112th Congress further attempted to cut federal funding for abortion 
and for family-planning services. 
A. The Abortion Compromise 
By the end of 2009, the House and the Senate had each passed a 
health care reform bill.188 Under usual circumstances, differences be-
tween the two bills would have been debated and mediated in commit-
tee.189 But a January 2010 special election in Massachusetts to replace 
deceased Senator Ted Kennedy resulted in the election of Republican 
                                                            
 185. The fate of the law continues to be challenged in courts and in Congress. See, e.g., Virgin-
ia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (the invalidating the individual mandate); Liber-
ty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (upholding the individual mandate 
and the Affordable Care Act generally); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (upholding the individual mandate and the legislation generally). See also H.R. 2, 112th Cong. 
(2011). The House passed H.R. 2 on January 19, 2011. H.R.2—Repealing the Job-Killing Health 
Care Law Act, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h2/show. 
 186. Among changes most relevant to this Article are the Act’s extension of Medicaid to cover 
Americans earning less than 138% of the federal poverty level and the inclusion of family planning 
among required “benchmark” services. See § 2303(c), 124 Stat. at 295; see also Sara Rosenbaum, 
The Medicaid Family Planning Coverage Expansion Option, HEALTHREFORMGPS, Mar. 7, 2011, 
http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/the-medicaid-family-planning-coverage-expansion-option 
-2/. 
 187. See infra Part IV.A & B. 
 188. The political decisions that led to passage of the Affordable Care Act in March 2010 are 
summarized in greater detail in Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate 
About the Affordable Care Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 45, 78–80 (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928919. 
 189. Michael B. Leahy, Despite Massachusetts Vote, Health Care Reform Still Coming, MASS. 
EMP. L. LETTER (Mar. 2010), http://blogs.hrhero.com/hrnews/2010/01/20/massachusetts-election-
mean-and-the-future-of-health care-reform/. 
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Scott Brown.190 Brown’s election deprived Senate Democrats of the sixty 
seats needed to pass a different version of the health care reform bill.191 
In order to save health care reform, Democrats in the House agreed to 
pass the bill that had been approved in the Senate (thus avoiding the need 
for a new Senate vote that was unlikely to succeed in light of Brown’s 
election).192 
But disagreement about federal funding for abortion under the Act 
emerged as a central concern.193 The Senate had added language to its 
bill that limited abortion funding, but the language did not satisfy a num-
ber of pro-life groups.194 Negotiations between President Obama and pro-
life members of the House resulted in a compromise: Obama agreed to 
issue an executive order that would preclude the use of federal funds 
available through the Affordable Care Act to pay for any abortions (ex-
cept in cases of rape, incest, or threat to the pregnant woman’s life).195 In 
short, Obama agreed that if the House accepted the Senate bill, he would 
restrict abortion funding under the Act through an executive order to be 
issued immediately after passage of the Act. 
The promised executive order read, in part: 
Following the recent enactment of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (the “Act”), it is necessary to establish an ade-
quate enforcement mechanism to ensure that Federal funds are not 
used for abortion services (except in cases of rape or incest, or when 
the life of the woman would be endangered), consistent with a 
longstanding Federal statutory restriction that is commonly known 
as the Hyde Amendment. The purpose of this order is to establish a 
comprehensive, Government-wide set of policies and procedures to 
achieve this goal and to make certain that all relevant actors—
Federal officials, State officials (including insurance regulators) and 
                                                            
 190. Carolyn Lochhead, Speaker Pelosi Bets the House on Health Care Reform, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 21, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-03-21/news/18841154_1_house-democrats-health-
care-parents-policies. 
 191. Jack Kelly, Might a Snub Sink the Health Bill?: The Supreme Court May Not Like the 
Way It Gets Passed, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/ 
10080/1044276-373.stm. 
 192. Id.; see also Gail Russell Chaddock, Health Care Reform “Fixes” Pass, But Is Biparti-
sanship Lost?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/ 
2010/0326/Healthcare-reform-fixes-pass-but-is-bipartisanship-lost. 
 193. Ultimately, the House passed a separate bill that altered a few provisions in the Senate 
bill; these provisions were especially problematic to a number of House Democrats. The Senate 
passed this altered bill by relying on a process that required only a simple majority for approval. Id. 
 194. STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW 
HEALTH CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 181 (2010). 
 195. George J. Annas et al., Women and Children Last—The Predictable Effects of Proposed 
Federal Funding Cuts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1590, 1590 (2011). 
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health care providers—are aware of their responsibilities, new and 
old.196 
In return for President Obama’s executive order, a group of seven pro-
life members of the House voted for the Senate bill without the addition 
of more restrictive anti-abortion language in the bill itself.197 The final 
House vote on the Senate bill was 219–212.198 
B. The 112th Congress and Poor Women’s Reproductive Health Care 
The 112th Congress, elected in November 2010—about eight 
months after President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act—brought 
a large Republican majority to the House. It included ninety-six new rep-
resentatives, eighty-seven of them Republicans.199 In the Senate, Demo-
crats maintained control but by a smaller margin than in the previous 
Congress.200 Many of the Republicans who had vociferously opposed 
health care reform during the campaign were ultimately elected to Con-
gress.201 Many of them had run for office on platforms committed to li-
miting the nation’s budget.202 The 112th Congress wove the two goals 
together. 
The new House began the session with a bill, offered symbolically, 
to repeal the Affordable Care Act.203 Then Congress shifted its attention 
to a series of bills intended to ban coverage for abortion and defund clin-
ics that provided family-planning services to hundreds of thousands of 
low-income women.204 The newly elected House prioritized cutting fed-
eral funding for reproductive care.205 
                                                            
 196. Exec. Order No. 13,535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 24, 2010). 
 197. George J. Annas, Perspective: The Real Pro-Life Stance—Health Care Reform and Abor-
tion Funding, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 356 (2010). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Gail Russell Chaddock, Michele Bachmann, Rand Paul, and 8 Others Shaking up the New 
Congress, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/ 
0131/Michele-Bachmann-Rand-Paul-and-8-others-shaking-up-the-new-Congress/Rep.-Darrell-Issa-
R-of-California. 
 200. Mike Wereschagin & Salena Zito, Frustrated Voters Set Up a Divided American Con-
gress, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/ 
s_708103.html. 
 201. See, e.g., Glenn Thrush, GOP Frosh: Where’s My Health Care?, POLITICO (Nov. 15, 
2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45181.html#ixzz15UGVFw42 (discussing newly 
elected Republican congressman Andy Harris). 
 202. Karoun Demirjian, Repeal of Health Care Bill Tops Agenda as GOP Takes Over House, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jan/05/repeal-health-care-
bill-crosshairs-gop-takes-over-/. 
 203. H.R. 2, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 204. Gail Collins, The Siege of Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/02/05/opinion/05collins.html. 
 205. See Annas et al., supra note 195. The House effort to cut abortion funding for poor wom-
en extended to women outside the United States. Chris Morris, House Committee Votes for Interna-
2012] The “Other” Within 405 
Anxious to clarify the implications of abortion-funding negotiations 
between Obama and the 111th Congress, the House offered a third bill 
(H.R. 3) also aimed at eliminating abortion funding.206 Among other 
things, H.R. 3 made the Hyde Amendment207 permanent by prohibiting 
the use of federal funds to cover abortion.208 It further precluded tax ben-
efits for any health care plan that covered abortion.209 
H.R. 3 made it clear that abortions could be funded only directly or 
through coverage “paid for entirely using only funds not authorized or 
appropriated by Federal law and such coverage shall not be purchased 
using matching funds required for a federally subsidized program includ-
ing a State’s or locality’s contribution of Medicaid matching funds.”210 
The practical consequences of restricting or eliminating abortion 
coverage for poor women may not directly manifest at the level of abor-
tions foregone.211 The evidence is mixed, but the bulk of it suggests that 
most poor women who want abortions locate the funds, even if with sig-
nificant difficulty, to pay for the procedure.212 There remain, however, 
significant psychological and health costs to women who increase their 
debt, convince friends or relatives to lend them money, or even use mon-
ey meant for food and rent to pay for an abortion.213 Moreover, in these 
situations, women are likely to delay their procedures, which increases 
health risks.214 The search for a provider may be discomforting, and poor 
                                                                                                                                     
tional Abortion Funding Restriction, JURISTS, July 21, 2011, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/ 
house-committee-votes-for-international-abortion-funding-restriction.php. In July 2011, the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs voted to ban U.S. funding to any international organization carrying 
out abortions. The provision (known as the “Mexico City policy”) was part of the Foreign Relations 
Appropriations Act. H.R. 2583, 112th Cong. § 922 (2011). 
 206. H.R. 3, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill passed in the House in a 251–176 vote on May 4, 
2011. H.R. 3: No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act, GOVTRACK, www.govtrack.us/congress/bill 
.xpd?bill=h112-3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). All 235 Republicans who voted supported the bill. 
Sixteen Democrats voted in favor of the bill, and 175 were opposed. Roll Call 292 on H.R. 3, 
GOP.GOV, http://www.gop.gov/votes/112/1/292 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 207. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the Hyde Amendment). 
 208. Exceptions are made in cases of rape, incest, and risk to the life of the pregnant woman. 
H.R. 3, 112th Cong. § 308 (2011). 
 209. Id. §§ 201–03. The bill remains on the Senate Legislative Calendar for consideration. See 
Bill Summary & Status, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.3: (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 210. H.R. 3, 112th Cong. § 304 (2011). 
 211. Harold Pollack, How Much Harder Will It Be for Women to Get Abortions?, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-treatment/how-much-harder-will-it-be-wo 
men-get-abortions. 
 212. In 2009, the cost was between $400 and $500. Id. 
 213. Id.; see also Gretchen E. Ely & Catherine N. Dulmus, Abortion Policy and Vulnerable 
Women in the United States: A Call for Social Work Policy Practice, 20 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. 
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women are often forced to rely on a “frayed” “patchwork of safety-net 
abortion providers.”215   
In addition, since passage of the Affordable Care Act, about a doz-
en states have moved to implement state exchanges that preclude pay-
ment for abortion.216 The exchanges, created by the Act as a venue for 
purchasing health coverage, are scheduled to become effective in 
2014.217 The exchanges provide a venue for purchasing health coverage 
for low-income people with incomes above the level of Medicaid eligi-
bility, as well as for some higher-income people.218 In effect, the state 
bans on funding for abortion extend the prohibition on the use of federal 
funds to nongovernmental insurance plans that will offer coverage 
through the exchanges in the states. It is also likely that insurance cover-
age for abortion will not be readily available through the larger market.219 
As a result, the majority of women seeking to terminate a pregnancy will 
be forced to pay for the procedure with personal funds.220 Once again, the 
consequences of abortion politics are disproportionately harsh for poor 
women. 
Precluding abortion funding for poor women might be marginally 
less disturbing were it not simultaneously accompanied by legislative 
proposals to limit funding for family-planning services. The Affordable 
Care Act expands Medicaid and offers health coverage through state ex-
changes to those currently without coverage. The agenda in the House, 
aimed at limiting or precluding public funding for contraception, magni-
fies the consequences of failing to provide low-income women coverage 
for abortion.221 
C. Efforts to Ban the Use of Federal Funds for Family Planning 
Congressional efforts to defund family-planning services have par-
alleled efforts to limit abortion funding. Republican lawmakers in the 
                                                            
 215. Pollack, supra note 211; see also supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
 216. Susan A. Cohen, Insurance Coverage of Abortion: The Battle to Date and the Battle to 
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112th Congress targeted family-planning services generally and Planned 
Parenthood clinics in particular.222 In early February 2011, as part of a 
budget-cutting agenda, the House passed H.R. 1, which cut all funding to 
Title X and specifically prohibited the use of any federal funds for 
Planned Parenthood.223 The defunding of Planned Parenthood was in-
cluded as an amendment proposed by Senator Mike Pence (R.-Ind).224 
Congress eventually passed compromise legislation (H.R. 1473) that did 
not include the Pence Amendment and that continued funding for Title 
X, albeit at a reduced level.225 Nonetheless, the 2011 defunding efforts 
are a powerful indicator of social responses to funding reproductive 
health care for poor women. 
Had Congress passed the budgetary cuts aimed at Title X and 
Planned Parenthood, the consequences for poor women would have been 
dismal.226  Title X clinics, many of which are run by Planned Parenthood, 
provide low-income women with family-planning services and screening 
for a variety of diseases, including HIV and other sexually transmitted 
diseases, and breast and cervical cancers.227 About 25% of poor women 
who receive contraceptive services obtain them through Title X-funded 
clinics.228 More generally, about 50% of low-income women in the Unit-
ed States who do receive contraceptive care receive that care through 
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Reach and Impact of Title X, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 20 (2011); Aimee Miles, A Guide to 
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(2011-2012), H.CON.RES.36, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:HC00036:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). In this Article, the 
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 224. Miles, supra note 223. 
 225. Press Release, Committee on Appropriations—Democrats, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Summary of H.R. 1473; FY2011 Appropriations (Apr. 12, 2011), http://democrats.appro 
priations.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=767&Itemid=28. 
 226. Cohen, supra note 223; see also Annas et al., supra note 195. 
 227. Annas et al., supra note 195, at 1590. 
 228. Cohen, supra note 223, at 20. 
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publicly funded family-planning clinics.229 For many of the women using 
these services, such clinics provide their only source of health care.230 
Moreover, the consequences of defunding family-planning clinics would 
be especially dire for poor women in light of existing strictures on feder-
al funding for abortion. Deprived of funding for contraceptive services, 
poor women would be more likely to face unintended pregnancies. 
Supporters of H.R. 1 and the Pence Amendment variously touted 
the measures by arguing that they demonstrated fiscal restraint231 and that 
the measures represented a stance against abortion.232 The two matters, 
though conflated in Congress, are not consistent.233 Even more, if suc-
                                                            
 229. Rachel Benson Gold, The Role of Family Planning Centers as Gateways to Health Cov-
erage and Care, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2 (2011). 
 230. Id. Gold reports one study that showed that Planned Parenthood centers in Los Angeles 
provide the only source of health care to almost 30% of adult clients and to almost 20% of adoles-
cent clients. Id. (citing S. Sugeman et al., Family Planning Clinic Clients: Their Usual Health Care 
Providers, Insurance Status, and Implications for Managed Care, 27 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 25 
(2000)). 
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ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE 
GAPS 21 (2011); see also Robert Pear, Panel Recommends Coverage for Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/health/policy/20health.html. The report recom-
mended that under the Affordable Care Act insurers should be required to offer contraceptive care to 
all women at no cost. COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, supra, at 22. An official sum-
mary of the report’s recommendations regarding preventive care for women pursuant to the Afford-
able Care Act described reducing unintended pregnancies as a positive goal and asserted that the 
goal can be achieved through the use of contraception and through contraceptive counseling. Id. at 
23. In consequence, the IOM Committee suggested that pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, all 
women with reproductive capacity be offered “the full range of Food and Drug Administration-
approved contraceptive methods.” Id. The Secretary of Health and Human Services responded al-
most immediately by issuing standards pursuant to the Affordable Care Act that would require insur-
ers to cover all FDA-approved contraception without co-payments. N. C. Aizenman, New U.S. Rules 
Require Insurance Coverage for Contraception, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-us-rules-require-insurance-coverage-for-contraception/2 
011/08/01/gIQAwdTRoI_story.html. The proposed new standards provide an exemption for certain 
religious organizations. Id. Yet, the rules have no immediate consequence for women without health 
insurance. Robert Pear, Insurance Coverage for Contraception Is Required, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/health/policy/02health.html. 
 231. See, e.g., Grover Norquist & Marjorie Dannenfelser, Economic and Social Conservatives 
Agree: Cut Planned Parenthood, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.nationalreview. 
com/corner/261444/economic-and-social-conservatives-agree-cut-planned-parenthood-grover-norqu 
ist. 
 232. Scott Forsyth, Commentary: House: Don’t Single Out Planned Parenthood, ROCHESTER 
DAILY REC., Mar. 9, 2011, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4180/is_20110309/ai_n5708278 
6/; Miles, supra note 223 (noting that Title X recipients are permitted to provide abortion services 
with segregated funds). Planned Parenthood clinics segregate funding and administrative activities 
relating to abortion from activities related to contraception and other health care services. Feldmann, 
supra note 222. 
 233. See Amanda Marcotte, Why Fiscal Conservatives Should Embrace Planned Parenthood, 
SLATE (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/03/why_fiscal_conser 
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cessful, the measures would have served neither end.234 They would have 
been costly, and they would have increased the rate of abortion.235 
Eliminating or significantly cutting public funding for reproductive 
health care to low-income women, including contraceptive care, would 
likely increase the birth rate.236 In 2009, a Guttmacher Institute report 
estimated that eliminating clinics funded through Title X would have led 
to 860,000 additional unintended pregnancies and 810,000 additional 
abortions per year for poor women.237 In 2008, the cost of a birth to Me-
dicaid, including prenatal, delivery, and postpartum care for the pregnant 
woman, as well as care for the baby for one year after the child’s birth, 
was $12,613.238 Contraceptive care in the same year cost $257 for each 
Medicaid-covered user.239 
Beyond their budgetary consequences, the failed measures would 
almost certainly have resulted in an increased number of abortions 
among the women they targeted.240 Unequal access to family-planning 
services makes it difficult for poor women to obtain contraception and to 
use it over time.241 H.R. 1 and the Pence Amendment would have signifi-
cantly worsened that situation. Poor women, without easy access to con-
traceptive care, are at risk for unintended pregnancies. They are more 
likely than other women to have unplanned children. But at least some of 
these women will decide to terminate their pregnancies despite the ab-
sence of Medicaid funding for abortion.242 
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html?artId=2056716?contType=article?chn=us. 
 234. See Marcotte, supra note 233. 
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of the abortions performed by Planned Parenthood are paid for with federal funds. Id. 
 236. Title X is the source of about 12% of public funding, while the largest source is Medicaid 
(71%). Amy Norton, U.S. Abortion Rate Down, But Up Among Poor Women, REUTERS (May 23, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/23/us-abortion-rate-idUSTRE74M6J420110523. 
 237. Annas et al., supra note 195, at 1591 (citing RACHEL BENSON GOLD ET AL., NEXT STEPS 
FOR AMERICA’S FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM, GUTTMACHER INST. (2009), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/NextSteps.pdf). 
 238. Kelly Cleland et al., Family Planning as a Cost-Saving Preventive Health Service, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 37, 39 (2011). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.; see also Annas et al., supra note 195, at 1591 (citing GOLD ET AL., supra note 237). 
 241. Michelle Chen, Demographics of Abortion: Race, Poverty and Choice, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 7, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-chen/demographics-of-abortion_b_ 
567915.html. 
 242. Id. (noting that “the profile of the abortion patient is disproportionately poor, as well as 
disproportionately Black or Latina”); Scott Johnson, Health Care Disparities at Issue in Abortion 
Rates Among Black Americans, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 11, 2011 (noting that the dispropor-
tionate rate of abortion among African-American women is due to “a widespread pattern of health 
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As commentators have noted, debate over the Amendment reflected 
both abortion politics and Congress’s attempt to trim the federal budg-
et.243 But the ramifications of both matters extend more broadly. The 
Pence Amendment reflected the complicated shifts in strategy that mark 
the American debate about abortion.244 The implications of abortion poli-
tics have often been far-reaching. Correlatively, the American debate (or 
more accurately, debates) about abortion has frequently offered the pub-
lic a rhetorical stage upon which people have defined and categorized 
themselves and others with reference to shifting political tendencies, re-
ligious affiliations, and sociocultural sentiments. Often the politics of 
abortion agendas only connect indirectly to abortion in the most specific 
sense.245 As Congress debated H.R. 1 and the Pence Amendment, it 
therein also debated class, gender, and inequalities in the provision of the 
nation’s system of health care coverage. As a spokesperson for Black 
Women for Reproductive Justice, responding to an anti-abortion bill-
board campaign across many cities during the summer of 2011, declared: 
“They want to make this about abortion, but this is about health dispari-
ties.”246 
More accurately, “this” is about abortion. And it is also about 
health care disparities. In the United States, abortion politics has long 
been a compelling context within which to present other agendas.247 In-
sofar as health care disparities and the ideology of class that they reflect 
are now at the center of the nation’s concerns, it is unsurprising that 
abortion politics voices these interests. 
D. States’ Limitations on Abortion and Family-Planning Services 
Recently, many state legislatures have entertained or passed bills 
that limit the right to abortion or trim state funding for abortions and 
family planning. The first subsection reviews new state laws that limit 
women’s right to abortion and notes the particular impact of those laws 
                                                                                                                                     
disparities in low-income and minority communities that prevents women from obtaining effective 
contraception”). 
 243. Feldmann, supra note 222; Ryan Grim, Government Shutdown Threatened by Republi-
cans Over Planned Parenthood, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/04/07/government-shutdown-planned-parenthood_n_846463.html. 
 244. Dolgin, supra note 20, at 114–28 (reviewing shifts in debate about abortion from the 
nineteenth century to the late-twentieth century in the United States); see also Liz Halloran, Abortion 
Foes Target Family Planning Program, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/20 
11/03/22/134662664/abortion-foes-target-family-planning-program. 
 245. Cohen, supra note 223, at 20. 
 246. Johnson, supra note 242. The anti-abortion billboards were paid for and distributed by a 
pro-life group, Issues4Life. Id. 
 247. See supra Part II. 
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on poor women. The second subsection reviews states’ attempts to limit 
funding for abortion or family-planning services. 
1. State Efforts to Limit Abortion 
In the first few months of 2011, nineteen states cumulatively 
enacted thirty laws that curtailed women’s right to abortion.248 In com-
parison, states passed twenty-three similar bills in 2010.249 These laws 
have imposed waiting periods on women seeking abortions, required 
women to look at ultrasound images of the fetus, and prohibited abor-
tions after twenty weeks of gestation.250 The same anti-abortion politics 
that energized Congress to limit funding for abortions and for family- 
planning services is also reflected at the state level. 
In the first half of 2011, five states enacted abortion bans after 
twenty weeks of gestation—a point at which the fetus is not viable.251 
Ten other state legislatures entertained similar bills. These laws252 were 
justified with the presumption—denied by established medical groups—
that the fetus feels pain at twenty weeks.253 
A bill passed by Ohio’s legislative House in June 2011 would ban 
abortions after detection of a fetal heartbeat, which usually happens be-
tween weeks six and ten.254 Fourteen states have considered bills that 
restrict abortions performed with the use of medication rather than sur-
gical procedures. Six of those fourteen bills have been enacted.255 In ad-
dition, eight states have passed laws that restrict coverage for abortion 
                                                            
 248. GUTTMACHER INST., STATES ENACT RECORD NUMBER OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS IN 
FIRST HALF OF 2011 (2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2011/07/13/index.html. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Erik Eckholm, Several States Forbid Abortion After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/us/27abortion.html. 
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11.html (reporting enactment of such laws in Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, and Oklahoma). 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), bars rules that 
prohibit abortions before viability if the laws place an “undue burden” on the pregnant woman. 
Nebraska passed a similar law in 2010. Eckholm, supra note 250. 
 252. These laws are open to constitutional challenge. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (precluding abor-
tion bans before viability that impose “undue burden” on pregnant woman seeking abortion). 
 253. Eckholm, supra note 250. The laws prohibiting abortion after twenty weeks do not pro-
vide exceptions for rape or incest, for medical threats to the mother (short of a threat of death or 
“serious physical impairment of a major bodily function”), or for cases in which it is discovered that 
a fetus is devastatingly impaired. Id. Groups opposed to abortion hope that Republican candidates 
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 254. Maureen Cosgrove, Ohio Governor Signs Bill Banning Abortions After 20 Weeks, JURIST 
(July 20, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/ohio-governor-signs-bill-banning-abortions-af 
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 255. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 251. 
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through state exchanges that will be implemented pursuant to the Afford-
able Care Act, as well as coverage through private health insurance 
plans.256 Six other states restrict coverage through state health exchanges 
but not through private insurance plans.257 
Although these laws seem to be aimed equally at all pregnant wom-
en seeking abortions, their impact is again felt most harshly by poor 
women. First, poor women are likely to find it harder than middle- or 
upper-class women to travel to other states or other nations for abor-
tions.258 Second, poor women now have abortions more often.259 Be-
tween 2000 and 2008, the rate of abortions among poor women increased 
(from 27% to 42%).260 
Additionally, even before enactment of these laws, poor women—
long denied adequate access to abortion—were more likely to carry unin-
tended pregnancies to term.261 In some part, these disproportionate num-
bers are consequences of cuts in funding for family-planning services 
that restrict poor women’s access to contraception.262 
2. State Efforts to Defund Family-Planning Services 
Several states have attempted to limit state funding for Planned Pa-
renthood specifically.263 Following Congress’s lead, these state govern-
ments justified singling out Planned Parenthood by noting that in addi-
tion to providing family-planning services and other forms of routine 
reproductive care, the organization performs abortions.264 North Caroli-
na’s response is illustrative. 
In the spring of 2011, North Carolina passed a budget precluding 
public funding for Planned Parenthood clinics.265 Janet Colm, the Presi-
dent of Planned Parenthood of Central North Carolina, noted that the bill 
represented the first time that the state legislature had singled out one 
health care provider and “banned [it] from applying for competitive 
                                                            
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Dehlendorf & Weitz, supra note 18, at 416. 
 259. Id. at 415. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 417 (citing L. B. Finer & S. K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rate of Unintended Preg-
nancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90 (2006)). 
 262. See supra notes 222–30 and accompanying text. 
 263. Defunding Planned Parenthood: State by State Scoreboard, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, 
http://www.sba-list.org/PPScoreboard (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 264. See supra note 235. 
 265. Zach Zagger, Planned Parenthood Seeks to Block North Carolina from Defunding It, 
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Beverly Perdue. Id. 
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grants from the state.”266 About 70% of people receiving reproductive 
health care from Planned Parenthood of North Carolina do not have 
health care coverage.267 One North Carolina legislator explained the leg-
islation by declaring that the state’s legislature has the right to decide 
“who is going to provide services with taxpayer dollars.”268 
North Carolina269 justified targeting Planned Parenthood for de-
funding by referencing its abortion services.270 In fact, Planned Parent-
hood’s family-planning services reach many women beyond those who 
seek abortion services.271 The majority of women receiving care at 
Planned Parenthood clinics get birth control from the clinics.272 
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Women, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/opinion/03fri1.html. Since 
then, the Indiana law has been enjoined by the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana. Zagger, Indiana to Appeal Ruling, supra. 
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Efforts to defund Planned Parenthood reflect class anxiety, as well 
as opposition to abortion.273 To many, the reproductive health needs of 
poor women signal the presumed irresponsibility of the women and of 
their class.274 For instance, many of the people who posted comments in 
response to a news story about North Carolina’s ban on state funding for 
Planned Parenthood clinics voiced these sentiments.275 One broad group 
of comments bemoaned the irresponsibility of women who rely on 
Planned Parenthood services funded by the state. Another said it was 
unfair that the public must pay for such services through taxes. A few 
focused equally on both matters. One commenter, concentrating on poor 
women’s presumptive irresponsibility, explained: 
God forbid anyone try to teach personal responsibility instead of 
“oh well, we don’t want it . . . someone else take care of it, or pay 
for me to get rid of it.” If you don’t want babies, don’t have sex. If 
you can’t abstain, use birth control or get your tubes tied. If you 
can’t afford either, you can’t afford to have sex.276 
Another commenter, responding to the proposition that sex is a bio-
logical imperative, exclaimed: “What happened to personal responsibility 
in this country. If you have consensual sex and get pregnant the results 
are your responsibility. Calling sex a ‘biological imperative’ is a way for 
liberals and Democrats to remove responsibility for getting pregnant 
from the woman and man who impregnated her.”277 
Other commenters were concerned with financial issues. “What’s 
Planned Parenthood for again?” asked one, and then answered the query: 
“Another wasteful program paid for by us??”278 Another explained the 
“Republican plan” for unplanned children carried to term, should abor-
tion become illegal: 
Umm it’s called parenting. How many abortions do you believe is 
okay for EVERY American to pay for out of OUR money? How 
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about 3 per household. I mean abortions for each woman? Let’s al-
low the Doctors to use screw drivers like that guy up East who per-
formed 1000s of them, where’d he get the money do you sup-
pose?279 
A number of postings stressed the limits of public responsibility 
and expressed anger at the unfairness of charging others for the conse-
quences of poor women’s irresponsibility. One poster in this group de-
clared: 
As heartless as it sounds, it’s not the public’s responsibility to fund 
planned parenthood. I mean goodness, the people USING planned 
parenthood are more than likely getting all their medical bills paid 
by the taxpayers as well. Sounds stereotypical, but call it like it is, 
people. WE all know the truth. And I’m tired of funding entitle-
ments. I work hard for my family, and that’s all I’m responsible for. 
Not my neighbor, not my friends, not anyone else. I can care about 
them, but I’m not responsible to pay their bills or take care of them. 
Period.280 
V. REPRODUCTION, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND THE 
POOR WOMAN AS “OTHER” 
Responses throughout the nation from those who opposed national 
health care reform more generally reflected similar sentiments. For in-
stance, many opponents—legal scholars,281 politicians,282 and others283—
saw choice and liberty as the targets of any health care reform that would 
significantly expand access to health care. Other critics contended that 
the Affordable Care Act would result in higher taxes and increased gov-
ernment control over people’s private lives.284 
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http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.3522/pub_detail.asp; James R. Edwards, Jr., Obama’s 
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Yet, in the weeks just before passage of the Affordable Care Act, 
the politics of abortion seemed to displace all of these concerns about the 
bill.285 The very passage of the bill hinged on one issue: federal funding 
for abortion. And once again, the debate about abortion offered a stage 
on which to entertain many controversial issues. In effect, the politics of 
health care reform were conflated with, and entertained under the guise 
of, the politics of abortion. 
This conflation harmed poor women more than other women be-
cause the focus of the debate was not the procedure itself, but rather its 
funding. Through the politics of abortion, poor women in need of repro-
ductive services became symbols of the perennial “American Other.”286 
Increasingly, these women were portrayed as undeserving and irrespons-
ible.287 Characterized as unworthy, women who depended on state assis-
tance for reproductive care were increasingly at risk of losing access to 
health care benefits essential to their well-being and to that of their child-
ren. 
Section A of this Part reviews several parameters of an American 
class ideology288 that fuels a national need to marginalize certain people 
(often identified through gender, race, or ethnicity) as social or economic 
“Others.”289 Section B illustrates the consequences of that ideology for 
poor women of childbearing age and explores the ramifications of that 
stigmatization while congressional debate about health care reform raged 
on in March 2010. In effect, poor women of childbearing age were 
marked as “Others” in the health care debate. Their health care needs 
were considered less important than those of other groups. Marking poor 
women as outsiders unable to enjoy the full benefits promised by health 
                                                                                                                                     
Health Reform Needs Medicine, HUMAN EVENTS (June 18, 2008), http://www.humanevents.com/arti 
cle.php?id=27077. 
 285. See supra Part IV.A. 
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race, ethnicity, and gender. See Etienne Balibar, Difference, Otherness, Exclusion, 11 PARALLAX 19 
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care reform threatens to widen deep disparities in health care coverage 
that reform was intended to redress. This exclusion reflects the nation’s 
opaque understanding of, and pervasive anxiety about, socioeconomic 
status. 
A. Status and Class Competition 
American society has long valued individualism and autonomy. 
Americans view individuals’ socioeconomic status as an offshoot of per-
sonal choices.290 Yet, even as they assess their own and each others’ so-
cial status, Americans mask the reality of the nation’s class system.291 
That is, the social assumptions that underlie class status in the United 
States are both pervasive and largely opaque. 
The consequence is anxiety and confusion. Americans believe, for 
instance, that one can avoid poverty or even move up in class status 
through responsibility and hard work. But in reality, social mobility is 
rare rather than common.292 On the whole, Americans are more con-
cerned with relative rather than absolute status. They focus on where 
they stand in comparison to others.293 American society lacks determina-
tive marks of socioeconomic status. That is to say, Americans have few 
certain indicia for assessing socioeconomic class.294 Class tension is fur-
thered by pervasive concern about safeguarding one’s own status relative 
to others.295 
Since the nation’s most recent economic downturn in 2008, Ameri-
cans’ anxiety has been fueled by the increasing difficulty of sustaining 
class status for everyone but the very rich.296 Many have lost jobs or have 
                                                            
 290. Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class in America: Shadowy Lines That Still Divide, N.Y. 
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taken lower paying jobs than those they held before the recession.297 As a 
result, anxiety about class status is now far more palpable than before 
2008.298 Other socioeconomic disparities add to the tensions. In 2011, 
Sarah Bloom Raskin, a Federal Reserve governor, explained that “grow-
ing levels of income inequality are associated with increases in crime, 
profound strains on households, lower savings rates, poorer health out-
comes, [and] diminished levels of trust . . . .”299 
Americans look to a shifting variety of material goods and cultural 
preferences when assessing their own class status as well as others’, es-
pecially those who are presumed to be relatively close to them on the 
socioeconomic hierarchy. Indicators of class status include tastes in mu-
sic, sports, or books, clothing, cars, home furnishings, and residential 
location. Over time, specific markers of socioeconomic status—
especially material goods—shift so that signs of high status one year be-
come irrelevant the next. As a result, people become less certain and 
more anxious about where they stand in the nation’s socioeconomic hie-
rarchy in relation to others.300 
Thus, Americans perpetually seek additional markers of socioeco-
nomic status—though generally without self-consciousness.301 They 
have, for instance, located a complicated but powerful set of indicia of 
class status in each others’ bodies. Certain fairly visible indicia of good 
or ill-health provide significant markers of status insofar as people as-
sume, very often correctly, that poor health attends economic hardship 
and low socioeconomic status.302 In fact, there is a stunning correlation 
between relative health status and relative socioeconomic status.303 
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Thus, often unconsciously, people seek visible signs of health status 
as evidence of socioeconomic status. They assess each others’ bodies and 
faces quickly and without conscious thought, and then rely on their as-
sessments as a measure of relative socioeconomic rank.304 They do this 
much as they assess each others’ clothes or homes or automobiles. 
Among the more telling signs of health and ill-health as marks of socioe-
conomic status are dental condition, posture, hair, skin, body size (espe-
cially the presence or absence of central-body adiposity), and an overall 
indication of energy or fatigue.305 Dental condition, for instance, is a co-
gent marker of socioeconomic status. Dental problems during child-
hood—one of the “most prevalent unmet health needs” of children306—
have lifelong consequences.307 Similarly, obesity has become a sign of 
social status. For a variety of reasons,308 poor people in the United States 
are more likely to be obese than middle- or upper-class people.309 
Studies have shown that people make rapid assessments about oth-
ers on the basis of signs and features of which they are not consciously 
aware. Research from the University of Aberdeen, for instance, found 
that large groups of women made very quick assessments about the com-
parative masculinity of male faces that had been altered by software to 
appear more or less masculine.310 
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Americans use assessments of health status as markers of socioeco-
nomic status within the same framework they use to explain poverty.311 
That frame has a forceful moral overlay. Signs of poor health that are 
linked with status are understood—as poverty is understood—as a con-
sequence of irresponsible choices.312 In short, Americans impose a moral 
frame on their assessments of health and class status.313 The “right” 
choices, suggested Philip Alcabes, are read as evidence that one is 
“[w]orthy in the modern American moral register of health.”314 
B. Narratives of the “Other”: Poor Women, Reproductive Care, and 
Health Care Reform 
Such assessments reflect the nation’s opaque ideology of class. 
They have fueled the creation of narratives about the irresponsibility and 
bad choices of those who are poor. These narratives explain both poverty 
and poor health among those in poverty. The Affordable Care Act, a law 
creating more universal health care, seems likely to level differences in 
health status, thus upending the deeply engrained set of embodied refer-
ence points on which Americans have relied in assessing the socioeco-
nomic status of others and of themselves in comparison.315 Such changes 
exacerbated Americans’ anxiety about safeguarding their comparative 
socioeconomic status. And the current recession further exacerbated this 
anxiety. 
No opponents of health care reform openly referred to the anxiety 
about losing ground in the competition for health status and thus for so-
cioeconomic status. Yet, much of the opposition to expanding health care 
at public expense made that assumption. Many opponents voiced anger 
about the use of public funds to care for people who, they argued, did not 
contribute adequately to the public purse.316 Thus, they saw development 
of universal or near-universal health care as an unfair reallocation of the 
nation’s resources, and they worried that their relative socioeconomic 
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status would fall as those below them gained access to health care as a 
result of the reforms.317 
These suggestions harmonize with work recently reported by a 
group of economists who documented and attempted to explain an aver-
sion to the redistribution of resources often found among those in low-
income groups.318 Ilyana Kuziemko and her collaborators, for instance, 
explored what they call a “last-place aversion.”319 They reported that op-
position to an increase in the nation’s minimum wage is strongest among 
those making slightly more than the minimum wage.320 We suggest that 
much of the opposition to the Affordable Care Act is grounded on a simi-
lar fear of slipping in relative status—a fear that trumps support for 
promised increases in resources for everyone. 
In the months surrounding passage of the Affordable Care Act, 
public attention focused on two groups of people considered unworthy of 
the benefits of expanded health care coverage. The first group—
undocumented immigrants—was completely excluded from the reach of 
the Affordable Care Act.321 The second group—poor women needing 
reproductive care—was excluded as well, but less completely and less 
explicitly.322 These women seem to be included among those covered by 
the Act, but the political process has been insensitive to their actual 
needs. Each group became the protagonist of a set of narratives that justi-
fied that group’s marginal status within the American social order and 
thus within the universe of health care reform. 
Shortly after Congress began actively to debate details of a health 
care reform law, then Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Democrat-
ic Montana Senator Max Baucus, exclaimed that no national health care 
system that might emerge from congressional debate would include cov-
erage for “undocumented aliens [or] undocumented workers.”323 Such 
coverage, Baucus further explained, would be “too politically explo-
sive.”324 The emotional intensity that attended this issue reflected a narra-
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tive of the “Immigrant Other” as a usurper of benefits presumed to be-
long to citizens.325 Depriving undocumented immigrants of the right to 
participate in a more universal system of health care coverage reaffirmed 
stigmatizing images of these immigrants, many Hispanic.326 Undocu-
mented immigrants were marked as an out-group,327 considered unde-
serving and marginal.328 
As undocumented immigrants became the out-group, deprived of 
participation in health care reform altogether, poor women with repro-
ductive capacity became the out-group within. These women were not 
expressly excluded from coverage, but they were to be denied a set of 
needed benefits that, if provided, might significantly level disparities be-
tween them and other people. Societal narratives that depict poor women 
as prone to bad choices,329 as being insubordinate,330 expensive, and even 
“hookers,” support their marginalization.331 
Within this setting, the politics of abortion has often served mul-
tiple ends.332 As the Obama administration agreed to restrict funding for 
abortion under the Act in exchange for promises from pro-life members 
of Congress to vote for the Act, it might have seemed as if the two mat-
ters—the politics of abortion and health care reform—were discrete, 
linked only by the happenstance of a bargain. In fact, they had become 
deeply entwined. The longstanding flexibility of abortion politics in the 
United States facilitated incorporating discomforting assumptions about 
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class and its significance. Furthermore, the cloak of abortion politics fa-
cilitated voicing, while downplaying, these assumptions. 
In this complicated debate about abortion, class status, and the im-
plications of expanding health care coverage, poor women were both 
protagonists and victims. To the extent that the implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act fails to provide adequate reproductive health care 
for poor women,333 it will exacerbate inequalities for poor women of 
childbearing age.334 Under the Act, poor women emerge again and again 
as the marginalized “Other,”335 against whom others can assess their own 
relative status. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Limits on funding for reproductive care reinforce the socioeconom-
ic marginality of poor women. Legislators’ justifications for such limits 
based on budgetary concerns are largely misleading.336 As we have ar-
gued, defunding family-planning services ultimately costs the nation 
money.337 Some proponents of such defunding justify it through refer-
ence to clinics’ abortion services. But defunding family-planning servic-
es and abortion coverage does not actually decrease the number of abor-
tions performed. 338 
This Article suggests that other concerns underlie efforts to limit 
funding for reproductive care,339 and that these concerns stem from with-
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in and serve an opaque class ideology that consistently befuddles at-
tempts to discern relative class status. Within that ideology, blame for 
poverty is placed on the poor, which creates significant tension among 
those fearful of falling in relative class status. In response, they construct 
a set of groups that can be identified easily as occupying the bottom 
rungs of the nation’s socioeconomic ladder. We do not argue that “pre-
texts,” such as budget worries and the politics of abortion, are not real. 
Only pretexts that are also real serve the “texts” whose interests they 
voice. The primary text is about class anxiety, primarily manifested as a 
fear of falling in relative socioeconomic status.340 That fear has been ren-
dered more pressing in the context of the recession that began in 2008. 
And it has been intensified by passage of the Affordable Care Act, which 
promises or threatens (depending on perspective) to level disparities in 
health care coverage. To many of those who opposed health care reform, 
the Act challenges precious cultural assumptions about how one safe-
guards one’s own socioeconomic status and how one assesses the status 
of others in comparison to one’s own. 
This Article has contextualized and illustrated the process through 
which people actualize these assumptions in the United States. In par-
ticular, preserving an image of a socioeconomic “Other” supplies a ba-
rometer for locating and assessing status. Poor women, deprived of fund-
ing for needed reproductive care, become an easy target for depiction as 
the “Other” within. On the surface, they were granted the right to partici-
pate fully in national health care reform (in contrast, for instance, with 
undocumented immigrants who were excluded completely), but without 
the actual services that they themselves need, poor women are unlikely to 
flourish and thus are unlikely to become competitors on the nation’s 
class ladder. 
The harm to poor women is clear. The harm to the nation is less 
clear but just as real. Significant socioeconomic inequalities create less 
stable and less successful societies than those characterized by compara-
tive equality between people at the top and people at the bottom.341 So-
cieties with wide disparities in class status are also characterized by high 
levels of ill-health and social problems.342 Japan, Sweden, Finland, and 
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many other countries characterized by comparative socioeconomic 
equality possess significantly better health and have fewer social prob-
lems than the United States.343 All of these countries—including the 
United States—have adequate resources with which to provide health 
care for everyone.344 But this goal cannot be achieved in the United 
States as long as the nation, even as it presumes to expand health care 
coverage, generally insists on categorizing some people as unworthy of 
enjoying full health care coverage and, more particularly, on characteriz-
ing poor women as the “Other” within. 
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